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As the reply on the Partnership's1 cross appeal, this brief focuses only on 
the district court's ruling concerning the East Triangle. It found that Veibell was entitled 
to the East Triangle under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, but this conclusion 
was wrong because Veibell did not establish each element of boundary by acquiescence. 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Partnership demonstrated in its opening brief that the district court's 
findings of fact on the East Triangle boundary by acquiescence claim were clearly 
erroneous. In rebuttal, rather than present record evidence supporting the district court's 
key findings on the East Triangle boundary by acquiescence claim, Veibell largely cites 
only to the district court's findings of facts, a map Veibell presented at trial, and the oral 
ruling of the district court. See paragraphs 7-15, 17, 26-28 of the fact portion of 
Appellant's Reply Brief and Cross-Appellee's Brief ("Veibell's Reply Brief). The 
district court's findings, however, are not evidence that they are in themselves not 
erroneous. Veibell needed to cite to some evidence from the record supporting those 
findings, which he failed to do. 
The only trial evidence Veibell referred to in his statement of facts mostly 
supports the Partnership's position. These are some of the recorded history of the Veibell 
and Ericksen properties, see paragraphs 1-62, the recorded evidence of the 1967 transfer, 
1
 As in its opening brief, the Partnership or its members are sometimes referred to 
as the "Ericksens." 
2These paragraph references are to the numbered paragraphs in the fact portion of 
Veibell's Reply Brief. 
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see paragraph 16, the evidence Veibell presented to support his claim that he did not 
know until 1981 that the fence was not the recorded boundary, see paragraphs 18-20, and 
evidence of an offer Veibell made to the Ericksens in 1996 to purchase the East Triangle. 
See paragraphs 21-22. With only one exception, however, these facts support the 
Partnership's position that boundary by acquiescence was not established. 
The facts about the record boundaries support the Partnership's position 
that Veibell's father and Durrell Ericksen's predecessor set the record boundary between 
their properties by the 1938 quit claim deed, without reference to the fence, even though 
the fence had been there for years already. See paragraphs 4-6; Def. Ex. 21, sheet 29. 
The facts about the 1967 transfer support the Partnership's position that after the 1967 
transfer, the fence was taken down along the West Triangle and the Partnership thereafter 
(and before) occupied the West Triangle with other property purchased in 1967. See 
paragraphs 16-17. The facts about the 1996 offer Veibell made to purchase the East 
Triangle from the Ericksens and their rejection of that offer show that none of those 
members of the Ericksen family had acquiesced in the fence as a boundary, and it shows 
that Veibell understood at that time the fence was not the boundary. See 
paragraphs 21-22. 
Veibell did testify that he first learned the fence was not the record 
boundary in 1981. See paragraphs 18-20. Yet, Veibell also admitted at trial he knew the 
1938 quit claim deed set the northern boundary of his property. R. 699 at 43-44. He also 
acknowledged that he knew a parcel he sold to his son in 1979 was right on the northern 
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boundary of his property and that parcel is not near the fence. R. 699 at 37, 39. That 
Veibell may have first learned the fence was not the boundary in 1981, moreover, is not 
enough by itself because nowhere does he establish mutual acquiescence for any amount 
of time. Thus, his boundary by acquiescence claim fails as a matter of law. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
Veibell suggests that judicial estoppel precludes the Partnership from 
arguing Veibell did not establish the elements of boundary by acquiescence because the 
Partnership had claimed the West Triangle by boundary by acquiescence. But, the 
Partnership never claimed at trial or under oath that the fence was the boundary between 
the Ericksen and Veibell properties. In its counterclaim, the Partnership had claimed title 
to the West Triangle based on boundary by acquiescence, but also based on adverse 
possession and that the West Triangle was included in the 1967 transfer. The Partnership 
presented evidence at trial that the fence along the West Triangle was taken down after 
the 1967 property transfer, and that the Partnership occupied the West Triangle before 
and after that and paid taxes on it since 1967. These facts supported the Partnership's 
alternative theories on the West Triangle. 
Veibell—and only Veibell—presented evidence that the fence was the 
boundary between his property and the Ericksens' property. The district court apparently 
based its ruling on the West Triangle on Veibell's evidence, not the Partnership's 
evidence. But, Veibell did not appeal the ruling on the West Triangle, so the district 
court's findings on that parcel are not even in play in this Court. The only reason the 
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evidence presented regarding the West Triangle is relevant here is to deal with Veibell's 
judicial estoppel argument. 
In any event, the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable because 
Veibell did not rely upon any representation or testimony by the Partnership concerning 
the fence, as there was none, and because Veibell had equal or better access to the facts 
regarding the fence. 
Regarding the East Triangle, the only thing Veibell established was that the 
fence was there for several years and the two families farmed up to it. He did not, 
however, establish mutual acquiescence in the fence as a boundary for any period of time, 
let alone a long period of time by adjoining landowners. He said he thought the fence 
was the boundary until either 1979 or 1981, but he did not present any evidence of what 
any of the Ericksens who owned the property understood about the fence. Bryce Ericksen 
testified he thought the fence was the boundary, but he never owned the property and he 
did not testify about what his brother, who did own the property, may have understood 
about the fence. Finally, Veibell's acknowledgment and treatment of the record boundary 
as the boundary for the 20 years prior to trial undercuts and defeats any evidence of 




I. VEIBELL DID NOT ESTABLISH ALL ELEMENTS OF 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE AS TO THE EAST TRIANGLE. 
A. Judicial Estoppel Does Not Prevent the Partnership From 
Claiming the East Triangle. 
Veibell posits that the Partnership is estopped from arguing that the fence is 
not the boundary between their properties as to the East Triangle because the Partnership 
claimed boundary by acquiescence as to the West Triangle. The only place the 
Partnership made this claim, however, was in its Answer and Counterclaim to Veibell's 
separate action seeking title to the West Triangle. Reply Add.3 1, 3-6.4 The Partnership 
also made claims for quiet title and adverse possession as to the West Triangle because 
the Ericksens had clearly occupied the West Triangle since the 1967 transfer when they 
took the fence down. Id. They also occupied it before 1967 according to the evidence 
presented by Veibell. See, e.g., R. 700 at 32. Pleading alternative theories in an initial 
pleading is certainly acceptable practice. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("Relief in the alternative 
or of several different types may be demanded."). 
3
 "Reply Add." means the Addendum attached to this brief. 
4
 Veibell filed a separate lawsuit claiming title to the West Triangle. That action 
was consolidated in the district court with the matter originally filed by RHN Corporation. 
While those records are included in the record on appeal, for some reason they were not 
numbered by the district court. Veibell cites the wrong counterclaim for his judicial 
estoppel argument when he cites the Partnership's initial counterclaim on the 1967 
transfer because that dealt with an entirely different fence and piece of property, and it did 
not even involve the West Triangle. See R. 115 and Veibell's Reply Brief at 4. 
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At trial, the Partnership presented evidence that after the 1967 transaction 
between Veibell and Durrell Ericksen, the Ericksens took the fence down that had run 
along the southern edge of the West Triangle and thereafter farmed and ran cattle on, and 
otherwise occupied, the West Triangle. R. 699 at 96, 110-111. The Ericksens paid taxes 
on 75.8 acres of land after the 1967 transaction. R. 699 at 113-14 and Def. Ex. 16. The 
fence simply was not an issue after 1967. Veibell presented evidence that the Ericksens 
occupied the West triangle before 1967. R. 700 at 32. 
The Partnership also successfully presented vast evidence on its reformation 
claim proving that the parties intended the transfer of about 75 acres in 1967. This 
evidence is discussed fully in the Partnership's opening brief. Nowhere at trial, however, 
did the Partnership present any evidence that the fence should have been recognized as a 
boundary between Veibell's property and the Ericksens' property. 
Even though the Partnership did not present evidence that it considered the 
fence to be a boundary between Veibell's property and the Ericksens' property, the 
district court, apparently relying upon Veibell's claim and testimony that the fence was 
recognized as the boundary by him, stated—after ruling on Veibell's claim to the East 
Triangle—that "[a]s a matter of being consistent, the only testimony I've heard is that the 
fence was treated as the boundary and it was the same fence all the way through." R. 700 
at 76. The district court continued: 
There's been no effort by Mr. Veibell to ever claim parcel A 
[the West Triangle] since the time of the conveyance. And as 
a minimum he would be estopped in any other action from 
somehow now coming in and claiming that the fence was not 
6 
a boundary. The court adjudicated in his favor that in fact it 
was the boundary. So parcel A would be determined to be the 
property of the Ericksens. 
Id. at 76-77 (emphasis added). These are the district court's only statements at trial 
concerning its finding that the Ericksens were entitled to the West Triangle based on 
boundary by acquiescence, and these statements were based entirely upon evidence 
Veibell presented.5 
Judicial estoppel "prevents a party from seeking judicial relief by offering 
statements inconsistent with its own sworn statement in a prior judicial proceeding." Salt 
Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1995) (emphasis 
added). The "purpose of judicial estoppel is to uphold the sanctity of oaths"' Id. 
(Emphasis added.) As such, judicial estoppel does not apply where "there is no evidence 
that the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought knowingly misrepresented any 
facts in the prior proceeding" or "where the party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel had 
equal or better access to the relevant facts." Id. Judicial estoppel also is not applicable 
where the party asserting it did not rely upon the prior statement to the party's prejudice. 
Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Investment Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388, 
390-91 (1942) ("there is no estoppel where there was no reliance and the parties had 
equal knowledge of the facts"). 
5
 This is also the only statement the district court made at trial regarding judicial 
estoppel. 
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Veibell has not shown a sworn statement the Ericksens made that he relied 
upon to his detriment or that otherwise gives rise to judicial estoppel. Nowhere under 
oath did the Ericksens claim that the fence formed the boundary between their property 
and Veibell's. The Ericksens only stated under oath that the fence was taken down in 
1967 and that they occupied the West Triangle after the 1967 conveyance, not that the 
fence was the boundary between their parcels. Veibell also had equal access to and 
knowledge of the facts concerning the fence. Indeed, the district court relied entirely 
upon Veibell's representations about the fence as the boundary in finding that the 
Partnership was entitled to the West Triangle under boundary by acquiescence. R. 700 
at 76-77. That's why the only reference to estoppel by the district court in the actual 
transcript of the trial is that Veibell is estopped from saying the fence is not the boundary. 
Id. At the trial itself, the district court said nothing about the Partnership being estopped. 
Thus, judicial estoppel does not apply to bar the Partnership's claim to the 
East Triangle.6 The Partnership is entitled to show that Veibell did not establish all of the 
elements of boundary by acquiescence as to the East Triangle. 
6
 The evidence the Partnership presented at trial concerning the West Triangle 
supported the Partnership's quiet title and adverse possession claims. See Reply 
Add. 3-6. The Partnership took the fence down in 1967 and occupied the West Triangle 
before and after that through the time of trial in 2000. R. 699 at 96, 110-11. The 
Ericksens also paid taxes on 75.8 acres from 1967 on. R. 699 at 113-14 and Def. Ex. 16. 
This, coupled with the evidence on the Partnership's reformation claim, is sufficient to 
support a finding that title to the West Triangle should be vested in the Partnership. 
Veibell did not appeal the ruling on the West Triangle, but even if he had it could be 
affirmed on the theories pleaded by the Partnership and still be consistent with a decision 
by this Court reversing the district court as to the East Triangle. 
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B. Veibell Did Not Establish All of The Elements of Boundary By 
Acquiescence As To The East Triangle. 
The Partnership demonstrated clearly in its opening brief that Veibell did 
not establish each of the elements of boundary by acquiescence, and Veibell has not 
refuted that showing. The best Veibell did was show that the fence has been there for 
several years and that he and the Ericksens farmed to the fence. But, he did not prove 
mutual acquiescence in the fence as the boundary for a long period of time by adjoining 
landowners. 
1. Occupation to the fence is not mutual acquiescence. 
A showing of occupation to the line claimed to be the boundary is not 
enough on its own to show mutual acquiescence. See Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 
(Utah 1979) ("plaintiffs occupation to the fence without interference was not sufficient 
to establish defendant's acquiescence in the fence as a boundary"); Nunley v. Walker, 13 
Utah 2d 105, 369 P.2d 117, 122 (1962) ("[I]f there is no uncertainty as to the location of 
the true boundary line the parties may not, knowing where the true boundary line is, 
establish a boundary line by acquiescence at another place."); Wilkinson Family Farm, 
LLC v. Babcock, 1999 UT App. 366 f 13 n.3, 993 P.2d 229, 232 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
("Acquiescence in use is not equivalent to acquiescence in a boundary."). 
All that Veibell showed was that he and the Ericksens farmed the land up to 
the fence, but he did not show that the Ericksens acquiesced in the fence as a boundary. 
R 699 at 9-11; R. 700 at 30-35. Veibell put Bryce Ericksen on, who testified he is a 
brother to Durrell Ericksen, and that he was around the farm from about 1935 to 1963. 
9 
R. 700 at 31, 33. Bryce Ericksen did not say anything about his brother's or anyone else's 
understanding about the fence. See R. 700 at 30-35. He simply testified that they farmed 
to the fence, and that he—Bryce Ericksen—thought the fence was the boundary. R. 700 
at 33. But, he is not Durrell Ericksen or Durrell Ericksen's predecessor, the only parties 
who have owned the property at the same time Veibell and his family have owned it. 
As discussed in the Partnership's opening brief, Bryce Ericksen was never 
an adjoining landowner with Veibell.7 Veibell does not dispute that Bryce Ericksen never 
owned the property; he simply makes as if that does not matter. But, just because Bryce 
Ericksen may have understood the fence was the boundary does not establish that any 
"adjoining landowner" with Veibell considered the fence line to be the boundary. Bryce 
Ericksen never testified about what any owner of the property understood about the fence. 
That the Ericksens and Veibells may have farmed to the fence line is not 
enough. That Veibell himself understood the fence to be the boundary is not enough. He 
was required to show "that both parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line, such 
as a fence or building, as the boundary of the adjacent parcels." Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 
33, H 18, 44 P.3d 781, 788 (Utah 2002) (italics in original). Veibell did not prove this and 
his claim for boundary by acquiescence fails. 
7
 He testified he thought he had purchased his father's property along with Durrell 
Ericksen in 1959 or 1960, but later admitted—when confronted with an abstract of title 
not listing him as having ever owned an interest in the property—that he did not know if 
he ever had part of the legal title before he left to go to school in 1963. R. 700 at 30, 
34-35. The abstract of title does not show him as ever owning an interest in the property; 
it only shows Durrell and Leola Ericksen. Def. Ex. 22; Reply Add. at 8-9. 
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2. All of the other evidence about the Ericksens shows that 
they did not acquiesce in the fence as a boundary. 
The only evidence about what the Ericksens understood—other than 
Bryce—was evidence concerning a 1938 deed setting the record boundary and a 1996 
offer Veibell made to acquire the East Triangle. No evidence at all was presented about 
what Durrell Ericksen understood. The only evidence was that he farmed to the fence, 
which by itself is not enough. 
There also was no evidence that Durrell Ericksen's predecessor acquiesced 
in the fence as a boundary. Indeed, the evidence was that he did not. The 1938 quit claim 
deed to Veibell's parents conveyed a strip of property 8.5 rods wide (about 140 feet) that 
ran the entire length of the property between their parcels, and established the boundary 
between the properties at 111.5 rods south of the section corner. There was no reference 
to the fence. Def. Ex. 21, item 29. Reply Add. at 8-9. This is the same boundary—111.5 
rods south of the section comer—that is the northern boundary in the deed whereby 
Veibell obtained title to the property in 1958. See Def. Ex. 1; Reply Add. at 10. This 
1938 deed defeats any inference of acquiescence in the fence as the boundary by Durrell 
Erickson's predecessor. See Nunley, 13 Utah 2d 105, 369 P.2d at 122 ("[I]f there is no 
uncertainty as to the location of the true boundary line the parties may not, knowing 
where the true boundary line is, establish a boundary line by acquiescence at another 
place."). 
Later, in 1996, at a time Veibell admits he had known for at least 15 years 
the fence was not along the record boundary, he sent a letter to the children of Durrell 
11 
Ericksen asking to purchase the property that constitutes the East Triangle. Def. Ex. 4; 
Reply Add. at 11. The Ericksens responded that they did not want to sell the parcel to 
him. Def. Ex. 5; Reply Add. at 12. An offer to purchase disputed property shows the 
parties had not acquiesced in a boundary. Williams v. Oldroyd, 581 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 
1978). 
Thus, the record evidence shows that the Ericksens considered the record 
boundary to be the boundary between the properties. Veibeil has not shown mutual 
acquiescence and the district court's ruling on this issue should be reversed. 
3. The evidence shows that Veibeil himself did not acquiesce 
in the fence as a boundary. 
Veibeil claimed that the first time he learned the fence was not the record 
boundary was in 1981. R. 699 at 11. Yet, he testified he knew the 1938 deed to his 
parents set the northern boundary of the Veibeil property. R. 699 at 43-44; see also item 
29 of Def. Ex. 21; Reply Add. at 8-9. Because Veibeil knew the 1938 deed set the 
northern boundary of his father's, and later his, property, there was no acquiescence even 
by Veibeil in the fence as a boundary. 
Veibell's only response to his acknowledgment that the 1938 deed set the 
northern boundary of his property was that the Partnership's counsel did not ask at trial 
when he obtained that understanding. Veibell's Reply Brief at 18. It was, however, 
Veibell's responsibility—not opposing counsel's—to clarify his testimony. 
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4. The Court cannot infer acquiescence from the testimony 
of the Partnership's witnesses. 
Veibell argues that the Court can infer acquiescence by the Ericksens 
because the Partnership's witnesses did not dispute Veibell's testimony that the fence was 
a boundary. Veibell's Reply Brief at 12-13. The burden, however, was not on the 
Partnership to disprove Veibell's claim. A party claiming boundary by acquiescence is 
the party that must establish the elements of the claim. Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 
1080 (Utah 1996). Failure by the claimant to prove any one element means a failure of 
the entire claim. Ault, 2002 UT 33, Tf 16,44 P.3d at 788. Thus, the burden was on 
Veibell, not the Partnership to prove his case. 
Because Veibell had not presented evidence of acquiescence by any of the 
Ericksens—except Bryce, who Veibell concedes never owned the property—the 
Partnership's witnesses were not obligated to testify concerning their lack of 
acquiescence. Veibell's counsel did not even ask them about the issue. Mutual 
acquiescence was not proved and the district court should be reversed. 
C. That Veibell Acquiesced In the Record Boundary for More Than 
20 Years Before Trial Sets That As the Boundary And Shows He 
Knew the Ericksens Did Not Acquiesce. 
If mutual acquiescence can establish a fence as a boundary, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that mutual acquiescence can also reestablish the record boundary 
as a boundary, notwithstanding prior history.8 "' When the parties agree that the line to 
8
 Veibell argues that the Partnership did not make this "re-acquiescence" argument 
at trial. However, the argument is clearly made in closing arguments by the Partnership's 
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which they occupy is not the true line and agree subsequently to ascertain the true 
boundary, the quality of the acquiescence is destroyed and no boundary is fixed by 
continued occupation.'5' Auk, 2002 UT 33,1f 18, 44 P.3d at 788 (quoting 12 Am. Jur. 2d 
Boundaries § 83 (1997)). 
Veibell claims he did not leam until 1981 that the fence was not the record 
boundary, but he testified he knew the 1938 quit claim deed set the northern boundary of 
his property, R. 699 at 43-44, and in 1979 Veibell sold a half-acre lot to his son, Craig 
Veibell, that is situated precisely in the northeast comer of the recorded property 
description. This lot sits right on the northern boundary established by both the 1938 quit 
claim deed and the 1958 deed to Veibell, and not in the comer established by the fence. 
See Def. Exs. 1, 3, and 21; Reply Add. at 3-6, 8-9, 10, 13; R. 699 at 36-38. The deed to 
Craig Veibell does not even mention the fence. Def. Ex. 3; Reply Add. at 13. Veibell 
testified he knew the lot he gave his son was right in the comer of what he owned, and he 
said that it was on a hill his son wanted, also negating his claim that he thought the fence 
was the boundary. R. 699 at 37; R. 699 at 79. If the deed showed the parcel given to his 
son as right in the comer of what he owned, yet it was on a hill his son wanted that was 
some distance from the fence, Veibell was clearly on notice that the fence was not the 
boundary. 
counsel. R. 700 at 62-63 ("for the last 21 years Mr. Veibell has not considered the fence 
to be the boundary"). 
14 
Veibell thereafter began to develop the property and had various plats 
drawn up in the 1990s using the correct record boundary as the northern boundary to his 
proposed development. See Def. Exs. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11. He also deeded the property to a 
corporation and back to himself in 1998, using the record boundary as the north boundary, 
not the fence line. Def. Ex. 9. 
In 1996, he sent a letter to the children of Durrell Ericksen asking to 
purchase the property that constitutes the East Triangle. Def. Ex. 4; Reply Add. 11. The 
Ericksens responded that they did not want to sell the parcel to him. Def. Ex. 5; Reply 
Add. 12. 
Thus, Veibell recognized for 20 years that the record boundary was the 
boundary. By such recognition, "'the quality of the acquiescence is destroyed and no 
boundary is fixed by continued occupation.'" Ault, 2002 UT 33, ^  18, 44 P.3d at 788 
(quoting 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 83 (1997)). 
At the very least, Veibell's actions in deeding to his son the parcel precisely 
in the corner of the recorded property description, in drawing up all the plat maps 
showing the record boundary as the boundary, and in attempting to buy the East 
Triangle from the Ericksens and their rejection of the offer, emphasize that he knew all 
along the Ericksens had not acquiesced in the fence as the boundary. 
Veibell did not meet his burden of proof on his boundary by acquiescence 
claim. The district court should be reversed on the claim regarding the East Triangle. 
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II. VEIBELL DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIM TO THE WEST 
TRIANGLE. 
Veibell apparently has conceded that he did not properly preserve his right 
to appeal his claim regarding the West Triangle. Thus, the Court does not even need to 
consider that issue. 
Yet, Veibell backs into an argument to reverse the district court on the West 
Triangle issue by suggesting that if the Court reverses on the East Triangle, the Court 
should also reverse the district court on the West Triangle. Veibell's Reply Brief 
at 21-22. This argument could only make sense if both claims rely upon the same 
evidence that the fence was a boundary between the properties. As discussed above on 
Veibell's judicial estoppel argument, however, they do not. The Partnership did not 
present any evidence that it considered the fence to be a boundary between the parcels. 
The only evidence the Partnership presented was that the fence was taken down in 1967 
when the Ericksens purchased the west part of Veibell's property, and the Ericksens have 
occupied the West Triangle ever since.9 R. 699 at 96, 110-11. Also, the Ericksens have 
paid taxes on 75.8 acres of property yet, due to an error in the deed, they have only 
occupied about 65 acres (which included the West Triangle). R. 699 at 113-14 and Def. 
Ex. 16. 
Apparently, the district court relied upon Veibell's testimony about the 
fence to conclude that it was a boundary. See R. 700 at 76-77. Veibell, however, did not 
9
 Bryce Ericksen also testified the Ericksens occupied the West Triangle before 
1967 as well. R. 700 at 32. 
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appeal the district court's ruling on the West Triangle, and for that reason the Court 
should not reverse findings on that claim. Yet, even if Veibell had appealed, the Court 
could find that the evidence the Partnership did present is adequate to support its other 
claims to the West Triangle based on quiet title and adverse possession. See Reply 
Add. 3-6. 
CONCLUSION 
The Partnership asks this Court to affirm the district court's ruling on its 
reformation claim, to reverse the district court's ruling on Veibell's boundary by 
acquiescence claim as to the East Triangle, and to rule that Veibell has waived his right to 
appeal the district court's ruling as to the West Triangle. If the Court reverses the district 
court's ruling on the East Triangle, the matter would have to be remanded to the district 
court for entry of an order returning the East Triangle to the Partnership. 
Dated this To day of March, 2003. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
barrels. Jenkins J 
Attornfeys^ ror Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
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Attorneys for the Leola J. Erickson Family 
Limited Partnership 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. ALTON VEIBELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEOLA J. ERICKSON FAMILY 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; all persons 
claiming any right, title, or interest in the 
following property in Box Elder County, 
Utah: Beginning at a Point 1834.75 feet 
S0° 10*27"E and 1629.34 feet S89° 49'33"W 
from the NE corner of Section 23, T12N, 
R2W, SLB&M, and running then West 
1009.35 feet more or less to the center line 
of Section 23, then S0° 10'27"E along the 
center of section line 150.19 feet more feet 
more or less to a point in line with a line 
bearing N81° 31'59"E from the P.O.B., 
then N81° 31'59"E 1020.01 feet more or 
less to the Point of Beginning. Containing 
1.74 Acres more or less. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 990100934 
Judge Willmore 
Leola J. Erickson Family Limited Partnership (the "Partnership") answers the 
Complaint by corresponding paragraph number as follows: 
1. Admit. 
2. Admit. The Partnership also affirmatively alleges that it is the owner of 
the property that is the subject of this action. 
3. Deny for lack of information. 
4. Deny for lack of information regarding what "certain property" is being 
referenced. 
5. Admit that some"property" was conveyed to the Partnership's predecessor 




9. Defendant incorporates its answers to paragraphs 1-8 above and either 
admits or denies the same. 
10. Deny. 
To the extent the foregoing responses do not address every allegation pleaded in 
the Complaint, the Partnership denies such remaining allegations. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a claim under the laws and statutes of Utah for which 
relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 




Plaintiff conveyed or intended to convey the subject property to the Partnership's 
predecessor. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
The Partnership owns the subject property pursuant to the doctrines of adverse 
possession and/or boundary by acquiescence. 
WHEREFORE, the Partnership prays that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with 
prejudice and that Plaintiff take nothing, and that the Partnership be awarded its costs and 
attorney fees in this action and such other equitable and legal relief as the Court may deem 
appropriate. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
The Partnership, for its counterclaim against Veibell, alleges as follows: 
1. The Partnership is a Utah limited partnership. 
2. Veibell is an individual residing in Cache County, Utah. 
3. More than 20 years prior to 1967, Veibell may have acquired from one of 
the Partnership's predecessors the property that is the subject of this action. 
4. Also more than 20 years prior to 1967, a fence was constructed dividing 
Veibell's property from the Partnership's predecessor's property. The fence ran along the south 
boundary of the property Veibell seeks title to by this action. 
5. This fence placed the property that is the subject of this action on the side 
of the fence where the Partnership's predecessor's property was located. For more than 20 years, 
3 
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the fence was treated as the boundary between the properties. The Partnership's predecessor 
farmed the property that is the subject of this action for more than 20 years prior to 1967. 
6. The Partnership's predecessor purchased the property that is the subject of 
this action from Veibell in 1967 along with other property. The transaction included more than 
75 acres to the south of what the Partnership's predecessor then owned and that formed a border 
to Veibell's property on the west. The property that is the subject of this action wras intended by 
the parties to be included in that transaction and was included in that transaction. 
7. After the Partnership's predecessor purchased the property from Veibell, 
the Partnership's predecessor built a fence beginning at the northwest corner of Veibell's 
property and running south thereby forming a boundary between Veibell's property and the 
Partnership's predecessor's property. Because of this new fence, the fence that had separated 
Veibell's property from the Partnership's predecessor's property prior to 1967 was taken down as 
it was no longer needed—the Partnership's predecessor now owned both sides of the fence. 
8. After the new fence was constructed in or about 1967, the property that is 
the subject of this action was located entirely on the Partnership's predecessor's side of the fence 
and was surrounded entirely by the Partnership's predecessor's property. 
9. The Partnership or its predecessor has openly farmed the property that is 
the subject of this action since long before and 1967. 
10. The Partnership or its predecessor has paid real property taxes to Box 
Elder County for the property that is the subject of this action since at least 1967. 
11. Since 1967, Veibell has never claimed an ownership interest in the 
property that is the subject of this action prior to filing this lawsuit. 
4 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Quiet Title) 
12. The Partnership incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs. 
13. The transaction between Veibell and the Partnership's predecessor 
intended to convey title to the property that is the subject of this action to the Partnership's 
predecessor, and in fact did convey such title to the Partnership's predecessor. 
14. The Partnership acquired the Partnership's predecessor's title to the 
property that is the subject of this action in or after 1968. 
15. The Court should quiet title to the property that is the subject of this action 
in the Partnership. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Boundary by Acquiescence) 
16. The Partnership incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs. 
17. Because Veibell and the Partnership's predecessor treated the old fence as 
the boundary between their properties, the Court should rule that the property that is the subject 
of this action belonged to the Partnership's predecessor even before 1967. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Adverse Possession) 
18. The Partnership incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs. 
19. The Partnership and its predecessor paid real estate taxes for the property 
that is the subject of this action for more than seven years. 
20. The Partnership and its predecessor have openly and notoriously farmed 
the property that is the subject of this action to the exclusion of all others for more than seven 
5 5 
years. Veibell has asserted no claim to ownership of the property at any time prior to the filing of 
this action. 
21. The Partnership is entitled to a ruling that it is the owner by adverse 
possession of the property that is the subject of this action. 
WHEREFORE, the Partnership prays that 
1. On its first cause of action, the Court enter judgment quieting title in the 
Partnership to the property that is the subject of this action; 
2. On its second cause of action, the Court enter judgment that the property 
belonged to the Partnership's predecessor prior to 1967 under the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence and now belongs to the Partnership; 
3. On its third cause of action, the Court quiet title in the Partnership to the 
property that is the subject of this action under the doctrine of adverse possession; 
4. The Court award the Partnership its attorney fees and costs as may be 
allowed under the laws of Utah; and 
5. The Court grant such other legal and equitable relief as it deems 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
DATED this^^D day of January, 2000. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
:ms \ ^ y 
Attorney^fer the Leola J. Erickson Family 
Limited Partnership 
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CRIPPEN & CLINE 
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Abstract of 1Rtle 
Prepared by 
PHILLIPS-HANSEN 
land Title (pmpany 
Member - American Title Ass*n. 
BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH 
TITLE I mm NCE 
opium: 
To th certain tract of land situated in the County of Box Elder, State of Utah, to wit: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 1 1 1 . 5 RODS SOUTH OF THE NORTHWEST CORNER 
OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 23, TOWNSHIP 12 NORTH, RANGE 
2 WEST, SAIT LAKE BAfJE AND MERIDIAN, RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 2 0 8 . 5 
RODS, THENCE EAST 160 ORDS, THENCE NORTH 2 0 8 . 5 RODS, THENCE WEST 
160 RODS TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING, CONTAINING 2 0 8 . 5 ACRES. 
(For P l a t of above , s e e Blue P r i n t f o l l o w i n g C e r t i f i c a t e . ) 
8 
Representing lajuyers Title Insurance (prporatlon Richmond, Virginia 
Abs t r ac t N o . l 4 4 i 8 Item No. ' ^ Reco rde r ' s No. 57276f 
Recorded Nov. 7, 1938 a t 11.55 a .m. , in Book 42 of Deeds, paae 282 
Kind of I n s t : QUIT C1AIM DEED, dated Sep t . 8, 1938. Con:-$lm00 
GRANTOR:-
Michael Erickson and Ethel M. Erickson, his wife 
GRANTEE:-
James Weibell also known as Jens Weibell 
SIGNED:-
Michael Erickson 
Ethel ~ Erickson 
WITNESS:-
C. Henry Nielsen 




...hereby convey and quit claim to.... 
land in Box Elder County, Utah. 
Beginning at a point 111.5 rods South of the Northeast corner 
of Sec. 23# T. 12 N. R. 2 w. S.L.M., running thence West 160 , 
rods, thence South 8.5 rods, thence East 160 rods, thence Nortn 




r-EE V - 2 * 2 Q TIME .2=25:.: : PM BOOK 2 3 6 
MARGARET R, EVANS - BOX aOER COUNTY RECORDER. 
WARRAJN& DEED< 
KIXE
 ? , ^ ^ ^ » S S^sNErS Wliboll, 
grantor 3 0 ! Logan v 
CONVEY and WARRANT Jta i, 
: ; J i ALTOH yEIBELL a n d 
Rlc«iT»> *ji»MLi*ms»«rai 
. .County of Cache .State of Utah; hsreby 
Kc£fwK» VEIBELL, husband and w i f e r 
.'.of :aturvivorshlp,\v^y-vi^:--O"^;-;>.0f.'5:-r.::^ v-, • 
'jBfantccs of : Beaver^ami ita^ 
for the aum of Twenty Thousand and no/iao~--— Dollars • '.•"•"•  \ .•.*• 
,the following described tract oE land In
 : U BOX E l d e r ; V County. Stfrte of Utah: 
. Beginning at a p ^ ','-.. 
12*Horthy.Range iTWest of the Salt lake Meridian, 
running thence South. 208*5'rods;;---thence East 160 rods;.: , 








May 16, 1996 
Leola J. Ericksen Family Ltd. Partnership 
c/o Charlotte Ericksen Nelson 
Beaver Dam, Utah 
Dear Charlotte: 
We have evaluated the options available to us for the alignment of the access road serving our High 
Country Estates subdivision. 
One option is to place the road where it presently exists, running westward from 400 West past the 
north side of Craig VeibelTs home and parallel to the established fence line which separates our 
property from yours. This is our preferred location. 
A second option readily available to us is to angle the access road slightly southward to join 400 West 
on the south side of Craig's home, thereby avoiding any contestable location. 
Either location will work for us. We would, however, like to propose a boundary settlement which 
would facilitate our preferred option, and compensate you acceptably. 
The sliver of land which might be contested is a long, wedge-shaped piece running from 400 West 
to a point near our northwest property corner and containing 4.53 acres. There is smaller, mirror-
image sliver extending on westward from that point containing 1.75 acres which, by record, is in our 
ownership. 
In order to both unify our respective boundaries consistent with the established fence line and provide 
•an incentive for you, we propose to: 
1) exchange the 1.75 acre sliver in our ownership for your quit-claiming any interest in a 
corresponding 1.75 acres in the contestable parcel, and 
2) for the remaining 2.78 acres of the contestable parcel, negotiate in good faith with you and 
compensate you in cash for any differential betweeen relative values. 
We request your response to this suggested settlement by June 1, 1996 
Sincerely, 
J. Alton Veibell 
June 10,1996 
X Alton Veibell 
14015 R 400 W. 
Beaver Dam, UT 84306 
Dear Alton: 
We received your letter of May 16 and appreciate your contacting us concerning the 
development of your High Country Estates subdivision- We have given this matter 
considerable time and review and find that our original decision has not changed. 
As far as our position is concerned, it remains as stated to you in our letter of June 17, 
1995. Basically "It is our decision not to sell our land next to your property nor to 
participate in the proposed development that has been outlined for that area." 
This decision allows us to utilize the full acreage belonging to us, which follows the 
Abstract of Deeds and also the current Cache and Box Elder County property 
descriptions. 
Sincerely, 
Charlotte R Nelson 
representing 
the Durell and Leola Ericksen family 
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WARRANTY DEED 
(JOINT TENANCY FORM) 
J. ALTON VEIBSLL and GRETHE C. V! IB ELL, husband and wife, 
pantor of County of 
State of Utah, hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to 
mB^^yBXBIL&t t**i?hjsnd varid v*£ f e f 
as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, with full rights of survivorship, 
grantees of 
for the sum of Ten dollara and other valuable consideration 
the following described "art nf land in Cach$_~ . County, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point 1839.75 feet South along the Section line and 49.5 feet Weat 
froa the Northeast corner of Section 23, Township 12 North, Range 2 West Salt Lake 
Baae and Meridian and running South 147.6 feet; thence Weat 147.6 feet; thence 
North 147.6 feet; thence Eaat 147.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
This Warranty Deed executed in duplicate for simultaneous recording in both 
Cache and Box Elder Countlea. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantors . this 
i^ned in the presence of 
27 t h A.D. 1979 
'%•#„ OUJM 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
County of Cache 
On the 2 7 t h day of March 
A.D. 19 79 personally appeared before me 
J. Alton Velbeli and Grethe C. Veibell, 
husband and wife, 
within instrument, who duly 
cte$,Ae'*hat they executed the same, 
' P U B L I C - ' 
?COMM»:;ION • 
•IS?"* -^ z%>&^-
' / < s < / v Notary Public 
m n j a ^ e ^ t r e s : 9 March 1983 
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